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Abstract 
 
We analyze the empirical violation of the Hillman condition, a necessary and sufficient 
condition for the correspondence between comparative advantage and pre-trade relative 
prices. Our comprehensive data set allows us to investigate the Hillman condition for virtually 
all countries of the world, over an extended period of time, for many sectors, and for different 
levels of aggregation. Violations of the Hillman condition are small as a share of the number 
of observations, but can be substantial as a share of the value of world exports. Measured 
either way, violations occurred much more frequently in the 1970s and early 1980s, a 
difference mostly caused by the two oil crises. As the condition is useful for identifying 
various anomalies, we argue that it should be included as a standard diagnostic test for 
empirical studies into comparative advantage. 
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1. Introduction 
The concept of ‘revealed’ comparative advantage, introduced by Liesner (1958) but refined 
and popularized by Balassa (1965) and therefore known as the ‘Balassa index’, is widely used 
empirically to identify a country’s weak and strong export sectors. Porter (1990) uses it to 
identify strong sectoral clusters, Amiti (1999) analyzes specialization patterns in Europe, 
Proudman and Redding (1998, 2000) focus on the dynamics of comparative advantage, 
Bojnec (2001) analyzes agricultural trade, Hinloopen and Van Marrewijk (2001) study the 
(dynamics of the) empirical distribution of European trade, and Fertö and Hubbard (2003) 
analyze competitiveness in Hungarian agri-food sectors. The theoretical basis for the Balassa 
index as an indicator of comparative advantage was provided by Hillman (1980), who 
diagrammatically developed a necessary and sufficient condition under homothetic 
preferences for the correspondence between the Balassa index and pre-trade relative prices in 
cross-country comparisons for a specific sector. Hillman’s condition can be easily verified 
empirically, which makes it rather surprising that it is completely ignored by the large 
majority of the empirical studies on revealed comparative advantage. In fact, Marchese and 
Nadal De Simone (1989), who analyze the exports of 118 developing countries in 1985 at the 
1-, 3-, 4-, and 5-digit level, provide the only thorough empirical investigation of the Hillman 
condition we are aware of.4 They conclude that the Hillman condition does not hold in the 
year 1985 for about 9.5 percent of the value of exports of their group of developing countries. 
In our study of monthly EU exports to Japan in the period 1992-96, Hinloopen and Van 
Marrewijk (2001) find that the Hillman condition does not hold for about 7.0 percent of the 
value of exports, or about 0.5 percent of the number of observations.5 In this study we find a 
similar dispersion between the importance of the Hillman condition in terms of the value of 
exports compared to the number of sectors. 
 
 This paper investigates the empirical violation of the Hillman condition using the Hinloopen 
and Van Marrewijk (2004) data set, which is based on the Feenstra (2000) data set. We have 
annual observations on bilateral trade flows for 1,056 4-digit sectors, 183 countries, and 28 
years, with a total of slightly less than 18.4 million positive observations. It allows us to 
thoroughly investigate the Hillman condition for virtually all countries of the world, over an 
extended period of time, for many sectors, and for different levels of aggregation. We find 
that for the period as a whole the Hillman condition is violated on average for less than 4 
percent of the value of exports and fewer than 0.2 percent of the number of observations. We 
also find that 1985, the year analyzed by Marchese and Nadal De Simone (1989), is not 
                                                 
4 It is not entirely clear to us why they do not investigate their data set at the 2-digit level. 
5 Marchese and Nadal De Simone (1989) use the 118 developing countries as reference countries, 
while Hinloopen and Van Marrewijk (2001) use the EU countries as reference countries.  
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representative of the degree to which the Hillman condition is met. Indeed, we find 
considerable fluctuation over time with high violations in the period 1970-84 and low 
violations in the period 1988-97. The relationship between violations of the Hillman condition 
and sector aggregation is clear regarding the number of observations, but not so clear 
regarding the value of exports. An overview of the sectors for which the Hillman condition is 
violated and a brief investigation into its link with aggregation issues reveals that the 
condition is rather useful in identifying anomalies. We therefore argue that it would be wise 
for empirical studies into comparative advantage to henceforth include an empirical 
evaluation of the Hillman condition as a standard diagnostic test. The next section briefly 
discusses the Balassa index, the Hillman condition and some methodological issues. Section 3 
gives an overview of violations of the Hillman condition. Section 4 analyzes the connections 
between sectors and countries in more detail. Section 5 focuses on a methodological 
aggregation issue, and section 6 concludes.  
 
2 The Balassa index, the Hillman condition, and methodology 
As it is hard to gauge the importance of a sector without a frame of reference, Balassa (1965) 
introduced normalized export shares as an indicator of revealed comparative advantage: 
(1) .
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of reference countries, as its export share for product j is larger than the concomittant export 
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in the studies mentioned above, but is most often determined by the largest set of countries for 
which the researcher has reliable data available for the study at hand.  
 
Hillman’s condition focuses on the correspondence between the Balassa index and pre-trade 
relative prices in cross-country comparisons for a specific sector under homothetic 
preferences by forming a Hicksian composite commodity for all other sectors. As the 
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Evidently, the condition can be easily verified empirically as it requires only (aggregation of) 
data on exports for different sectors. Three economic variables are important:  
§ market power, as measured by åi jtijti XX ,, / , that is the share of a country’s exports in a 
particular sector relative to the total exports in that sector for the reference countries, 
§ the degree of export specialization, as measured by å j jtijti XX ,, / , that is the share of a 
country’s exports in a particular sector relative to that country’s total exports, and  
§ country size, as measured by ååå i j jtij jti XX ,, / , that is the share of a country’s total 
exports relative to total exports for the group of reference countries.  
 
Of these three economic variables the first two are most important for determining violations 
of Hillman’s monotonicity condition, which does not hold if a country has a significantly high 
degree of market power in combination with a significantly high degree of export 
specialization. The condition is somewhat less stringent for large countries. To operationalize 
wether a violation of the Hillman condition is the result primarily of high market power or a 
high degree of export specialization, we follow the convention of the Netherlands 
Competition Authority that in principle a market share exceeding 50 percent in a certain 
sector indicates a dominant position. In the analysis below, consequently, any violations of 
the Hillman condition will be classified as the result of a high degree of market power if a 
country’s share of exports in that sector relative to the total exports in that sector is at least 50 
percent. Otherwise, the violation is attributed to a high degree of export specialization.  
 
We can expect the degree of sector aggregation to affect the extent to which the Hillman 
condition is violated. At lower levels of aggregation, that is as more sectors are identified, it 
becomes easier in principle for a country to achieve a dominant position (high market power) 
in a specific, more narrowly defined sector. Other things equal, this tends to increase the 
number of violations of the Hillman condition. Other things are, however, not equal as the 
degree of export specialization falls at lower levels of aggregation, which tends to decrease 
the number of violations of the Hillman condition. Whether or not the Hillman condition is 
violated more or less frequently at lower levels of aggregation depends on the interaction 
between the above two forces and is, therefore, an empirical matter. We have data available at 
the 4-digit SITC level, and will consequently analyze the connection between the aggregation 
problem and the Hillman condition at the 1-, 2-, 3-, and 4-digit level. In principle, there are 
ten 1-digit sectors (0-9), each subdivided in ten 2-digit sectors, etc. In theory, this would lead 
to 10,000 sectors at the 4-digit level. In practice, we have data available for 1,056 different 
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sectors. As a methodological note, to be further addressed in section 5, we perform our 
calculations only at the appropriate level of aggregation. At the 4-digit level, for example, we 
indeed focus on the 4-digit level as such and ignore trade flows effectively classified at the 3-
digit level, such as category 752A/X ‘automatic data processing machines & units thereof’ 
which could refer to trade flows in any of the more detailed 4-digit categories 7521, 7522, 
7523, 7524, 7525 or 7528. Similarly, for our calculations at the 2-digit and 3-digit level, see 
Feenstra (2000) for further details.6 The Balassa index, however, is always calculated relative 
to a country’s total trade flows in any given year, thus including trade flows classified 
exclusively at higher levels of aggregation. 
 
3. Violations of the Hillman condition 
Table A1 in the appendix provides a list of the 183 countries included in our analysis. For 
each of these countries and for all 28 years in our data set (1970-97) we verified if the 
Hillman condit ion was met for four different levels of aggregation. 7 Regarding the number of 
observations for the period as a whole, our findings can be summarized as follows: on 
average the Hillman condition is violated for  
§ 2.6 out of 1,490 observations annually at the 1-digit level,  
§ 2.8 out of 8,044 observations annually at the 2-digit level,  
§ 3.1 out of 21,981 observations annually at the 3-digit level, and  
§ 1.3 out of 31,127 observations annually at the 4-digit level. 
This summary, however, does not do justice to the historical development of these violations 
nor to the importance of the violations as measured by the share of exports not satisfying the 
Hillman condition. Table 1 provides more detail regarding both these aspects. The bottom line 
of Table 1 clearly shows that the violations of the Hillman condition as a share of the number 
of observations is very small and decreases at lower levels of aggregation. It also shows, that 
as a share of the value of total exports the violations of the Hillman condition are more 
important and are roughly the same at the 1-, 2-, and 3-digit level (on average more than 3.29 
percent), only to decline at the 4-digit level (on average 0.63 percent). 
 
                                                 
6 We also do not report results on sectors with trade flows below $100,000. 
7 Restricting attention to the 168 ‘real’ countries, that is excluding the set of ‘not elsewhere specified’ 
countries (see the appendix), does not affect the sectors for which the Hillman condition is violated. 
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Table 1 Aggregation and share of exports not satisfying the Hillman condition, 1970-97 
 share of # of observations (%) share of value of exports (%) 
year 1-digit 2-digit 3-digit 4-digit 1-digit 2-digit 3-digit 4-digit 
1970 0.37 0.10 0.03 0.00 3.17 6.08 5.67 3.50 
1971 0.29 0.08 0.03 0.00 2.77 3.31 5.79 0.24 
1972 0.22 0.05 0.02 0.00 2.70 2.86 4.20 0.23 
1973 0.14 0.04 0.01 0.01 2.21 2.38 2.33 0.38 
1974 0.36 0.07 0.02 0.00 10.14 8.96 7.46 0.23 
1975 0.29 0.07 0.03 0.01 6.37 6.75 6.53 0.71 
1976 0.22 0.05 0.03 0.01 6.87 7.13 9.20 0.64 
1977 0.29 0.08 0.03 0.01 7.68 10.12 9.96 4.08 
1978 0.33 0.07 0.03 0.01 6.78 8.61 7.79 4.42 
1979 0.26 0.04 0.03 0.00 5.09 4.53 7.81 0.12 
1980 0.26 0.06 0.03 0.01 8.47 8.75 8.69 0.67 
1981 0.26 0.04 0.02 0.00 8.52 7.73 8.17 0.08 
1982 0.26 0.04 0.01 0.01 6.53 5.36 5.25 0.62 
1983 0.26 0.05 0.01 0.00 5.20 4.96 4.34 0.04 
1984 0.20 0.06 0.02 0.01 3.51 4.32 3.71 0.50 
1985 0.20 0.02 0.00 0.00 1.67 1.21 0.66 0.04 
1986 0.20 0.02 0.00 0.00 1.07 0.71 0.00 0.10 
1987 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.71 0.40 0.29 0.00 
1988 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.09 
1989 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.92 0.52 0.87 
1990 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1991 0.20 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.68 0.36 0.36 0.03 
1992 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1993 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
1994 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1995 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 
1996 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.01 
1997 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ann. aver. 0.18 0.04 0.01 0.00 3.29 3.41 3.55 0.63 
The total number of cases not satisfying the Hillman condition in the period 1970-1997 is 73 at 
the 1-digit level, 79 at the 2-digit level, 88 at the 3-digit level, an 35 at the 4-digit level. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the development over time of the violations of the Hillman condition at the 
four different levels of aggregation. Panel a depicts the development as a share of the number 
of observations. It not only shows that this share is low for all four levels of aggregation, 
never to exceed 0.4 percent in any given year, and that this share decreases for lower levels of 
aggregation, but also that, for a given level of aggregation, it falls over time, particularly from 
the second half of the 1980s onwards. The latter is much more pronounced in panel b of 
Figure 1, which depicts the development over time as a share of the value of exports. 
Violations of the Hillman condition are very valuable in the period 1970-84, with a peak of 
10.14 percent at the 1-digit level in 1974, to become much less important and virtually 
disappear in the period 1988-97. We now analyze these fluctuations in more detail.   
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Figure 1 Development of violations of the Hillman condition over time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Sectors, countries, and the Hillman condition 
Table 2 lists the 73 observations at the 1-digit level (from a total of 41,733 observations) for 
which the Hillman condition does not hold. In all cases, the violation is caused by a high 
degree of export specialization and never the result of high market power at this level of 
aggregation. With one exception (SITC 0: “food ...” from St. Pierre Miqu) all violations are 
for SITC 3: “mineral fuels, ...”. Again, with one exception (Paraguay), all the SITC 3 
violations are from oil-exporting nations, while the majority of the observations takes place in 
the 1970s and early 1980s. This clearly suggests that the two oil crises of 1973 and 1979 are 
the main culprits for violations of the Hillman condition. As discussed in section 3, the peak 
of violations in value terms (10.14%) occurs in 1974 at the 1-digit level. It involves only five 
countries: Libya, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela.8 
                                                 
8 Actually, at first we thought we made a mistake, having in mind the present share in total world trade 
flows of these five countries, which is below 2 percent. Double-checking everything, and comparing 
with other sources, revealed that we did not make any mistakes: these five countries indeed controlled 
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Table 2 Observations not satisfying the Hillman condition; 1-digit SITC, 1970-1997 
code description country years 
0 Food and live animals chiefly for food St Pierre Miqu 79 
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials Algeria 79-87, 91, 92, 94, 97 
  Libya 70-83, 85, 86 
  Venezuela  70, 74 
  Kuwait 70-72, 74 
  Qatar 70, 71 
  Saudi Arabia  70-84, 90 
  Iran 74-78, 83 
  Oman 75 
  Iraq 77, 78, 80, 85-87 
  Un Arab Em 78 
  Nigeria 81, 82, 84, 91 
  Paraguay 91 
 
Table 3 Observations not satisfying the Hillman condition; 2-digit SITC, 1970-1997 
code description country years 
06 Sugar, sugar preparations and honey Cuba 75-78 
33 Libya 70-81, 83, 86 
 
Petroleum, petroleum products and 
related material Venezuela  70 
  Kuwait 70-72, 74 
  Qatar 70, 71 
  Saudi Arabia  70-84 
  Iraq 71, 77, 78, 80, 83-89 
  Iran 74-78, 83, 84 
  Oman 75 
  Nigeria 81, 82, 84, 85, 91 
35 Electric current Paraguay 91 
68 Non-ferrous metals Zambia 70-74 
93 Special transactions & commod., not 
class. to kind 
South Africa 80 
99 Non-identified products Former USSR 70, 77, 78 
  Zimbabwe 79 
  Romania 80, 82, 84* 
  East Germany 89 
  Reunion 96 
* indicates market power (at least 50 percent of the relevant world ma rket) 
 
Table 3 lists the 79 observations at the 2-digit level (from a total of 225,230 observations) for 
which the Hillman condition does not hold. With one exception (“non-identified products” 
exported from Romania in 1984) all violations are caused by a high degree of export 
specialization and not by high market power. Relative to the information given in Table 2, we 
see some more detail. The violations for SITC 3 for the oil-exporting countries are 
contributed to SITC 33 “petroleum, ...”, while it is related to SITC 35 “electric current” for 
                                                                                                                                            
more than 10 percent of the value of world trade flows in 1974; testimony of the high real price of oil 
and its dominant position in world trade shortly after the first oil shock.  
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Paraguay. Apart from the uninformative “non-identified products” category, which may refer 
to clandestine trade, arms deals, trade with nations without official trade ties, trade flows 
which have not been properly classified, etc., there are only three new items: SITC 06 “sugar, 
...” exports from Cuba, SITC 68 “non-ferrous metals” exports from Zambia, and SITC 93 
“special transactions, ...” exports from South Africa.  
 
Table 4 Observations not satisfying the Hillman condition; 3-digit SITC, 1970-1997 
code description country years 
061 Sugar and honey Cuba 75-78 
271 Fertilizers, crude Morocco 74 
286 Ores and concentrates of uranium and 
thorium 
Niger 78-80, 81* 
333 Libya 70-77, 80, 81 
 
Petrol. oils & crude oils obt. from 
bitumin. minerals Qatar 70, 71, 76 
  Saudi Arabia  70-84 
  Iran 74-78, 83, 84 
  Oman 75 
  Iraq 71, 77-81 
  Nigeria 79, 81-85, 87, 91 
  Kuwait 95, 96 
351 Electric current Paraguay 91 
524 Radio-active and associated materials Niger 88 
682 Copper Zambia 70-77 
793 Ships, boats and floating structures Reunion 97 
931 Special transactions & commod., not 
class. to kind 
South Africa 80 
999 Non-identified products Former USSR 70-72, 76-79 
  Zimbabwe 79 
  Romania 80, 82, 84* 
  East Germany 70, 71, 89 
  Reunion 96 
* indicates market power (at least 50 percent of the relevant world market) 
 
Table 4 lists the 88 observations at the 3-digit level (from a total of 615,467 observations) for 
which the Hillman condition does not hold. With two exceptions (Romania [see Table 3] and 
SITC 286 “ores ... uranium ...” exports from Niger in 1981) all violations are caused by a high 
degree of export specialization and not by high market power. Relative to the information 
given in Table 3 we again see somewhat more detail. The SITC 33 violations are caused by 
SITC 333 “petrol. oils ...”, Cuba’s violation is related to SITC 061 “sugar and honey”, 
Zambia’s “non-ferrous metals” is related to SITC 682, “copper”, while SITC 351 “electric 
current” and SITC 931 “specia l transactions ...” are actually 3-digit classifications. The 
newcomers are radio-active for Niger (SITC 286 and SITC 524), but not for Morocco (SITC 
271 “fertilizers, crude”) and Reunion (SITC 793 “ships, boats ...”).  
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Figure 2 Level of aggregation and share of total trade covered 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An important advantage of analyzing trade flows in general and comparative advantage in 
particular at lower, more detailed levels of aggregation is the increased coherence and 
homogeneity of the specific markets analyzed, and therefore the more precise identification of 
a country’s strong and weak export sectors. An important disadvantage is that some of the 
information is not available at lower levels of aggregation, such that a lower share of total 
trade flows is represented by the data. As illustrated in Figure 2, this disadvantage of lower 
representation at lower levels of aggregation is not very important if we go from the 1-digit to 
the 2-digit level or if we go from the 2-digit to the 3-digit level. It is, however, a major 
problem when we go from the 3-digit to the 4-digit level as many trade flows (about 40 
percent of total trade flows) are not disaggregated to the 4-digit level. We have to keep this in 
mind when studying Table 5, which lists the 35 observations at the 4-digit level (from a total 
of 871,543 observations) for which the Hillman condition does not hold.  
 
Table 5 Observations not satisfying the Hillman condition; 4-digit SITC, 1970-1997 
code description country years 
0611 Sugars, beet and cane, raw, solid Cuba 75-77, 78* 
2479 Pitprops, poles, piling, posts & other wood in rough Indonesia  73* 
2814 Brazil 86*, 88* 
 
Roasted iron pyrites, whether or not agglomerated 
Papua N. Guin. 93* 
2873 Guinea 78, 82-85, 91 
 
Aluminium ores and concentrates (includ.alumina) 
Jamaica 80, 81 
3359 Petroleum oil prep & residues nes Neth Antilles 88*, 89* 
6821 Copper and copper alloys, refined or not, unwrought Zambia 71-78 
9999 Non-identified products Former USSR 70, 77, 78 
  Zimbabwe 79 
  Romania 80, 82, 84* 
  East Germany 89 
  Reunion 96 
* indicates market power (at least 50 percent of the relevant world market) 
 
SITC 9999 “non-identified products” is most prominent in Table 5. We have encountered it 
before in Tables 3 and 4 for the 2- and 3-digit sectors. Indeed, one could argue that it is 
actually an ‘aggregate’ sector consisting of a broad range of miscellaneous products, but it is 
formally classified as a 4-digit sector. With the exception of Cuba’s sugar (SITC 0611) and 
Aggregation and share of  trade covered (%), 1970-97 annual average
100.00 99.67 99.46
60.39
0
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100
120
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Zambia’s copper (SITC 6821) all other entries in Table 5 are new, mainly because the more 
precise sector definition makes it possible for countries to achieve a dominant market share. 
In fact, 8 of the 35 violations of the Hillman condition (23 percent) is attributed to market 
power, see Table 5 for details.  
 
5 Aggregation and the Hillman condition 
Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 above list violations of the Hillman condition at the 1-, 2-, 3-, and 4-digit 
level, respectively. As explained in section 2, these tables are ‘clean’ by analyzing only trade 
flows at the appropriate level of aggregation. The Hillman condition is not satisfied if a 
country has a high market power in a certain sector, with a pure monopoly as the most 
extreme example, in which case the Hillman condition does not hold. This issue is, however, 
clearly related to the aggregation / data-classification problem. To illustrate this, we 
recalculated the Hillman condition for all countries, sectors, and years at the 3-digit level, this 
time including the 1-digit and 2-digit ‘aggregates’ as reported at the 3-digit level (for ease of 
notation the aggregates are defined using a ‘0’ or ‘00’ at the end). 
 
Table 6 lists the 109 aggregates at the 3-digit level that do not satisfy the Hillman condition. 
In most cases, namely 85 out of 109 (or 78 percent), this is the result of the country having a 
reported ‘monopoly’. In all cases the violation is attributed to market power (the market share 
is actually at least 92.6 percent). Clearly, the Hillman condition turns out to be most useful in 
such instances at identifying peculiarities, in this case a data-classification problem. In the 
1980s and 1990s, for example, Germany frequently is the only country classifying products at 
the ‘miscellaneous’ 1-digit level, the categories ‘600’, ‘700’, ‘800’, and ‘900’ in Table 6, 
resulting in an artificial monopoly readily identified by the Hillman condition. Similarly, 
while most other countries take the trouble to identify if the exported ‘dairy products and 
birdseggs’ are either ‘milk and cream’, ‘butter’, ‘cheese and curd’, or ‘eggs and yolks, fresh, 
dried, or otherwise preserved’, Hungary simply lists them as ‘dairy products and birdseggs’. 
Although not leading to a monopoly for Hungary in the years 78-83, the Hillman condition 
does pick up this classification problem, as it does for Hungary’s classification of sectors 
‘010’, ‘040’, and ‘050’, see Table 6.  
 
 
 11
 
Table 6 Aggregate sectors at the 3-digit level violating the Hillman condition*, 1970-1997 
code description country years 
010 Meat and meat preparations Hungary 88, 89, 91, 94 
020 Dairy products and birds eggs Hungary 78-83 
040 Cereals and cereal preparations Hungary 73, 76, 81, 92 
050 Vegetables and fruit Hungary 71 
100 Beverages and tobacco Sri Lanka 74 
110 Beverages Hungary 93, 94 
200 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels China 70-72, 74-78, 80, 81 
  Austria  93 
300 Czechoslovakia  76, 78 
 
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related 
materials Guinea-Bissau 80 
  Austria  93 
320 Coal, coke and briquettes Former USSR 80 
  Hungary 95 
330 Petroleum, petroleum products and 
related material 
Former USSR 86 
400 China 70-76 
 
Animal and vegetable oils, fats, and 
waxes Czechoslovakia  78 
420 Fixed vegetable oils and fats Hungary 92, 94, 95 
500 Chemicals and related products n.e.s. China 71, 75 
  Papua N. Guin. 79, 80 
  Austria  93 
600 Guinea-Bissau 79 
 
Manufactured goods classified chiefly 
by material Germany 82-87, 89-92, 94, 96, 97 
700 Machinery and transport equipment Zaire 76 
  Guinea-Bissau 79 
  Germany 82-87, 90-92, 94, 96 
790 Other transport equipment Hungary 94 
800 Miscellaneous manufactured articles Ireland 70-72 
  Neth Antilles 78 
  Guinea-Bissau 79 
  Germany 82-87, 90-92, 94, 96, 97 
840 Articles of apparel and clothing 
accessories 
Mauritius 96 
900 Ireland 70 
 
Commodities & trans.  not classified 
elsewhere Czechoslovakia  78, 79 
  Germany 90-94, 96, 97 
* the relevant market share for all observations in this table is at least 92.6 percent 
 
6 Conclusions  
We analyze the empirical violation of the Hillman condition, a necessary and sufficient 
condition for the correspondence between comparative advantage as measured by the Balassa 
index and pre-trade relative prices. Hillman’s monotonicity condition, which is somewhat less 
stringent for large countries, does not hold if a country has a significantly high degree of 
market power in a certain sector, in combination with a significantly high degree of export 
specialization. Our comprehensive data set of annual bilateral trade flows for 1,056 4-digit 
SITC sectors between 183 countries over 28 years allows us to thoroughly investigate the 
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Hillman condition for virtually all countries of the world, over an extended period of time, for 
many sectors, and for different levels of aggregation.  
 
For the period 1970-97 as a whole, we find that the Hillman condition is violated on average 
for less than 4 percent of the value of exports and fewer than 0.2 percent of the number of 
observations. This average is, however, a poor indicator, as we also find considerable 
fluctuations over time, with high violations in the period 1970-84 (up to 10 percent of the 
value of world exports) and low violations in the period 1988-97 (on average less than 0.26 
percent of the value of world exports). This remarkable difference is mostly caused by the 
1973 and 1979 oil crises. As a share of the number of observations, violations of the Hillman 
condition are rare and occur less frequently at lower levels of aggregation. As a share of the 
value of exports, violations of the Hillman condition are more important and represent about 
the same share of exports at the 1-, 2-, and 3-digit level, only to fall significantly going to the 
4-digit level (when the share of exports covered also drops significantly). In virtually all cases 
at the 1-, 2-, and 3-digit level, violations of the Hillman condition are caused by a high degree 
of export specialization (think of  the oil-exporting countries, Cuba’s sugar, and Zambia’s 
copper). Only at the 4-digit level, a substantial share of the violations are caused by a high 
degree of market power. A brief investigation at the 3-digit level shows that the Hillman 
condition is also rather effective at identifying data-classification problems. We therefore 
argue that it would be wise for empirical studies into comparative advantage to henceforth 
include an empirical evaluation of the Hillman condition as a standard diagnostic test (as the 
analysis above shows that the condition is useful for identifying anomalies), and to restrict 
attention to those industries that satisfy the Hillman condition. 
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Appendix   Table A1 List of countries 
South Africa Somalia French Guiana Mongolia 
Algeria Zimbabwe Guyana Vietnam 
Liby Arab Jm Togo Panama Asia Cpe NES 
Morocco Uganda Surinam Belgium-Lux. 
Western Sahara Untd Rp Tanzania Rest America NES Denmark (Incl Faroe Islds)
Sudan Burkina Faso Israel France 
Tunisia Zambia Japan Germany 
Egypt Other Africa NES Bahrain Greece 
North Africa NES Canada Cyprus Ireland 
Cameroon Usa Iran Italy 
Central Afr. Rep. Bermuda Iraq Netherlands 
Chad Greenland Jordan Portugal 
Congo St Pierre Miqu Kuwait Spain 
Gabon Argentina Lebanon United Kingdom 
Ceuca NES Bolivia Oman EEC NES 
Angola Brazil Qatar Austria 
Br.Ind.Oc.Tr Chile Saudi Arabia Finland 
Burundi Colombia Fm Dem Yemen Iceland 
Comoros Ecuador Syrn Arab Rp Norway 
Zaire Mexico Untd Arab Em Sweden 
Benin Paraguay Turkey Switzerland 
Eq. Guinea Peru Fm Yemen Efta NES 
Ethiopia Uruguay Yemen Gibraltar 
Fr.So.Ant.Tr Venezuela Middle East NES Malta 
Djibouti LAIA NES Afghanistan Other Eur NES 
Gambia Costa Rica Bangladesh Albania 
Ghana El Salvador Bhutan Bulgaria 
Guinea Guatemala Brunei Czechoslovakia 
Cote D'ivoire Honduras Myanmar (Burma) Fm German Dm Rp (East) 
Kenya Nicaragua Cambodia Hungary 
Liberia CACM NES Sri Lanka Poland 
Madagascar Bahamas Hong Kong Romania 
Malawi Barbados India Fm Eur Cpe NES 
Mali Cayman Islds Indonesia (Incl Macau) Fm Yugoslavia (Incl 
Croatia, Slovenia) 
Mauritania Cuba Korea Rp (South) Fm Ussr 
Mauritius Dominican Rp Laos P.Dem.R Australia 
Mozambique Guadeloupe (Incl 
Martinique) 
Malaysia New Zealand 
Niger Haiti Maldives Solomon Islds 
Nigeria Jamaica Nepal Fiji 
Guinea-Bissau (incl Cape 
Verde) 
Neth Antilles Pakistan Kiribati (incl solomon 
islds, tonga, tuvalu) 
Reunion St Kitts Nev (Incl Dom. 
Mont, St Luca,St Vin.*) 
Philippines New Caledonia (Incl Fr 
Polynesia, Vanuata) 
Rwanda Trinidad-Tobago Singapore Papua N.Guinea 
St.Helena Turks Caicos Isl Thailand Oth. Oceania NES 
Senegal Caribbean NES Taiwan Areas NES 
Seychelles Belize China Unknown Partner 
Sierra Leone Falkland Isl Korea D P Rp (North) (* and Grenada) 
 
